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How to Conclude a Brief
or
Concluding a Brief and Its Relationship to Argument Ordering in MultiIssue Appeals
by Brian Wolfman*
(12.25.2021 draft)
I. Introduction
A while back, I observed a fleeting discussion among a few appellatelitigation mavens in the #appellatetwitter crowd about what should go in the
“conclusion” section of an appellate brief. This essay explores that issue and
its relationship to problems of argument ordering in multi-issue appellate
briefs. A friend suggested to me that these two topics are unrelated. I think
they are, but if you think they’re not, then please read this essay as two
separate essays that I’ve mistakenly bundled together!
II. Conclusions in briefs: the Rules and beyond
If you want to know what to include in a conclusion in an appellate
brief, as with all parts of briefs, start with the court rules. They are generally
a useful starting point because they are issued by the audience: judges. The
rule makers have told us what they want. The Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, or FRAP, call for “a short conclusion stating the precise relief
sought.” Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9). The Supreme Court rule doesn’t expressly
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demand brevity, but it similarly requires “[a] conclusion specifying with
particularity the relief the party seeks.” S. Ct. R. 24.1(j).
So, what should you do?
A. Prefer short, relief-based conclusions
All but one participant in the Twitter discussion thought that a brief’s
conclusion should be short and sweet. Yet, many briefs contain lengthy,
repetitive, argumentative conclusions. I think those kinds of conclusions are
a mistake and agree with the majority of the appellate Twitter folks. Here’s
why.
First, at least for federal appeals, the rule says so. True, FRAP 28(a)(9)
doesn’t expressly ban things other than a statement of “the precise relief
sought,” but its demand for a “short” conclusion seems to spit on anything
more. Typically, it’s a good idea to follow rules that the court’s judges have
themselves issued (duh), unless there’s an excellent case-specific reason to
deviate and departures from the rule’s express commands are at least
tolerated (that is, you know that nonconformity won’t cause the court clerk
to bump the brief).
Second, the convention—particularly among first-rate brief writers—is
to keep conclusions quite short. Top appellate advocates generally state only
the relief sought (affirmance, reversal, and the like). So, for better or for
worse (and I think better), keeping conclusions short will meet the judges’
expectations and not seem out of place or inconsistent with high-quality
brief writing. All other things equal, that’s an important factor.
Third, as explained in more detail below, it is important to state
precisely the relief your client desires, and if you lard up the conclusion with
another summary of your arguments or an extended rhetorical flourish
about the justice of your client’s position, the request for relief could get lost
in the sauce. That’s taking quite a risk.
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Finally, and relatedly, extended, argumentative conclusions are
necessarily repetitive. By the time the judges (or law clerks) get to the
conclusion, they may have already digested an (optional) introduction
providing the gist of your positions. They would have already read your
statement of the case, which likely will have included hints at your
arguments. And the judges would, one would hope(!), already have read the
summary of argument and the argument because the rules demand that they
be there. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(7) & (8). Some brief writers also employ a
variety of somewhat argumentative roadmaps and mini-introductions to
sub-arguments. (I typically avoid those things out of concerns over
repetition.) So, by the time the judges get to your conclusion, you should
have made your points and made them well. You can’t discuss appellate
advocacy with a judge for more than a few minutes and not learn that judges
think that briefs are too long and repetitive. So, cut the judges a break at the
end of the brief by telling them just what you want and nothing more.
B. Examples of no-muss, no-fuss conclusions
As indicated above, it’s important that judges and law clerks know
exactly what your clients want them to do. Put the other way around, it
would be really bad if the only reason that your clients didn’t get just what
they wanted is that you did not ask for it with enough clarity or specificity.
And remember that’s just what’s called for by the federal appellate rule
(“precise relief sought”) and the Supreme Court rule (“specifying with
particularity the relief”).
Sometimes stating the relief can be quite simple because the precise
relief sought is no more than affirmance for the appellee or reversal and
rendering of judgment for the appellant. Other times, it is sufficient (and
adequately precise) to say that your client wants only a reversal and a
remand for further proceedings.
Here are some examples of no-muss, no-fuss conclusions taken from
briefs recently filed by Georgetown Law’s Appellate Courts Immersion
3
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Clinic (@ImmersionClinic). (The briefs are linked below, so you can judge
whether the conclusions are adequate in light of what has come before
them.) Note that these examples are the entire conclusions:
• The district court’s judgment should be affirmed. (The district court
had granted summary judgment to our client on all claims.)
• The judgment of the district court should be reversed and remanded
for a trial on the merits of Smith’s FMLA interference and retaliation
claims against Defendants. (Summary judgment had been granted
against our client on two claims, and we were specifying that reversal
was required on both claims and that no further summary-judgment
proceedings were needed—that is, we were expressly indicating that,
on remand, the case should simply go to trial.)
• This Court should reverse the district court’s judgment and remand
the case for further proceedings. (The district court had granted our
opponent’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, so more pretrial proceedings were necessary before any trial plausibly could
occur.)
• This petition for initial hearing en banc should be granted. (Because
all we wanted the court to do was grant our request for en banc review
before a panel even heard the appeal!)
• The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied. (Because all we
wanted was for the Supremes to see the case our way and deny cert.)
C. More complex conclusions and a few examples
Sometimes more complex conclusions are needed to serve your clients
and meet the Rule’s requirements. The situations demanding a complex
conclusion are too numerous to list, and, besides, the specifics needed in any
given conclusion generally will turn on the peculiarities of the case. But it’s
fair to say that more complexity and nuance tend to be called for when (1)
the relief sought or opposed varies across multiple claims; (2) there’s more
4
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than one party on one or both sides of the “v”; (3) relief is sought or opposed
in the alternative; (4) threshold rulings will (or will not) make other relief
necessary or sensible; (5) the standard of review is not the same across all
issues; and (6) the issues decided below were not all decided at the same
stage of the litigation (motion to dismiss, summary judgment, trial verdict,
post-trial, etc.).
Below, I describe three appeals litigated by Georgetown Law’s
Appellate Courts Immersion Clinic involving varied relief, multiple parties,
procedural nuances, and other complexities. We felt that these factors
required us to go beyond the no-muss, no-fuss conclusion. Note that, in each
case, we tried to obey FRAP 28(a)(9)’s insistence on specificity, while not
running afoul of its demand for brevity. That is, we were specific as the
circumstances required, but tried to be economical. And, as in the no-muss,
no-fuss context, we concluded without repetitive argument.
Case 1. In this appeal, all our clients’ claims—employmentdiscrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and an
analogous state statute, a federal equal-protection claim, and a couple
different retaliation claims under the same federal and state statutes—were
poured out, either on a motion for judgment on the pleadings or at summary
judgment. Our clients sued two defendants—a city and an individual—but
only the equal-protection claim and the state statutory claims ran against the
individual. Moreover, on the statutory discrimination and equal-protection
claims (but not on the retaliation claims), our clients argued below (and
maintained on appeal) that they were entitled to partial summary judgment
as to liability but not as to relief. So, in this appeal, our conclusion needed to
be quite particularized:
• This Court should reverse the district court’s judgment in favor of
Defendants on Plaintiffs’ Title VII, Ohio Civil Rights Act, and Equal
Protection Clause claims. It should also reverse the district court’s
denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on their Title
5
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VII discrimination claims against the City and their Ohio Civil Rights
Act and Equal Protection Clause claims against both Defendants and
instruct the district court to grant judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor as to
liability on those claims. Finally, the Court should remand the
retaliation claims for trial.
Case 2. Here our client was seeking alternative remedies. So, we
couldn’t simply say that we wanted reversal or affirmance; we needed to
spell out the alternatives. Our client was ordered removed from the U.S. in
absentia without an inquiry into the merits of her asylum claim, and she
wanted the Board of Immigration Appeals to rescind the removal order or,
at the least, the Board to remand to give an Immigration Judge the
opportunity to consider the case on its merits. (I’m not linking to the brief
because it is not publicly available.)
• This Court should grant the petition for review, reverse the Board’s
order, and remand to the Board for rescission of the removal order.
Alternatively, the Court should remand the case to the Board with
instructions to return the case to the Immigration Judge for a ruling on
the merits.
Case 3. Finally, here’s a cross-appeal brief, in which we argued that the
district court properly vacated our client’s sentence, but improperly reimposed his supervised-release term, without providing any reasoning. On
the latter, we weren’t certain that we could get outright reversal, so,
alternatively, we sought remand:
• This Court should affirm the district court’s grant of Peterson’s
habeas motion and vacatur of Peterson’s sentence. But this Court
should reverse the district court’s imposition of three years of
supervised release. Alternatively, this Court should remand and direct
the district court to consider, with an explanation, the appropriate
supervised release term, if any.
6
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III. The connection between conclusions and argument ordering in
complex, multi-issue appeals
If you’re litigating a simple, one-issue appeal, try to end your
argument with a bang, and then move right into your simple, one-or-twosentence conclusion (as just discussed in Part II).
But there’s a problem in many (if not all) complex, multi-issue appeals.
Often, the writer is forced to end a brief with an argument that is weaker or
less important than her other arguments or with an argument for which the
relief is not optimal.
How should you order the arguments in, say, a three-issue appeal?
The answer may be as simple as putting the strongest claim first, the nextstrongest claim second, and the weakest claim last—with all arguments
judged in terms of legal strength.
But there are often confounders. What if the client’s strongest claims,
legally, are the ones that get the client the least cash or the least desirable
injunction? What if your client is a repeat player or ideological litigant who
wants to lead with a particular argument because she cares more about her
long-term strategic interests than winning “big” in the particular case? And
then, there may be a perceived need to lead with an argument that is
relatively weak legally but that appears to be logically antecedent. That
antecedent question may be something as deeply ingrained in our legal
culture as a prerequisite to suit (such as standing or the statute of limitations)
or something as quirky as a three-part doctrinal analysis that the case law
happens to set forth in a particular order, such that any deviation would
appear naïve, defensive, or suspicious.
The conundrum is that application of one ordering criterion (say, legal
strength) may conflict with another (say, that prevailing on the strongest
argument will give your client almost no bucks). There’s no easy answer for
how to order arguments when the considerations I’ve just discussed point
7
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in different directions, and I’m not attempting to resolve the problem in this
essay. Suffice it to say for now that, like most knotty appellate-writing
problems, the key is not to wing it. Don’t just throw up on the paper. Be
conscious about the argument ordering problems just described, trying to
ensure that you’ve properly balanced the competing considerations.
My principal concern in this essay, however, is different: the
relationship between argument ordering and conclusions. As indicated,
many times ordering conventions will require the advocate to end the brief
with an argument that is less powerful or less important than her earlier
arguments. In many cases, just the fact that the argument appears last will
convey a message of weakness or lack of importance (often a reason, by the
way, to keep back-end arguments as short as possible).
So, what’s a brief writer to do? One always wants to end with a
(relative) bang, not a whimper. But for the reasons already given in my
discussion of conclusions, and as underscored by the rule makers’
preferences for brevity and specificity, and their focus on stating the relief
sought, the answer is not to lard up your conclusion with a summary of your
earlier, favorite arguments or with some rant about why you’re right. Judges
won’t go for that.
Here’s what I suggest instead. Whenever possible, before the
conclusion, come up with some effective way to end your secondary or
tertiary arguments by drawing on the themes or substance of your earlier
arguments. To make this technique work well, you need to make plausible
connections, and sometimes that can’t be done well. But often it is possible
to conclude your last argument by creating a tie to an earlier one. Here are
three examples, the first hypothetical and the latter two based on real briefs.
Case 1. You are handling a civil-rights appeal for a plaintiff who
claims, first, that the police conducted a warrantless search of her home in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, and second, that after arresting her, the
police obtained a coerced (and false) confession in violation of her due8
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process rights. Assume that your appellate brief pursues both claims, but
sensibly argues the Fourth Amendment claim first because it is legally
stronger and so ends with the weaker due-process claim. As noted, a good
appellate advocate generally seeks a way to end with a bang, so tethering
the Fifth Amendment claim back to the Fourth Amendment claim through a
theme of pervasive government intrusion and misconduct may be the way
to go—after all, the same police department that conducted the warrantless
search also allegedly coerced the confession. Perhaps there’s even something
that an officer said in conducting the search that presaged the later
misconduct at the police station. If so, you may want to use that as you end
the brief.
Case 2. Those of you who’ve litigated Freedom of Information Act
cases know that plaintiffs will argue, first, that they are entitled to
government records because the government has not sustained its claim of
a statutory exemption from disclosure, such as the exemptions protecting
trade secrets, certain privileges, or personal privacy. See 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4),
(5), (6). But plaintiffs will often argue, as a fallback, that if they’re not entitled
to the records in their original, pristine form, the government must redact
only the exempt parts and release the rest, as the statute requires when a
record is “reasonably segregable.” 5 U.S.C. 552(b) (last paragraph). The latter
argument is often important to unearthing at least some important
government information, and the possible alternative—leaving empty
handed—is worse. Your brief will of course start by arguing that you are
entitled to everything, and it’s a bummer to end a brief with the segregability
argument because it presupposes that the government is right on the key
legal issue—that the records are (at least in part) exempt from disclosure.
But the plaintiff’s lawyer may be able to finesse this problem. The
theme is government secrecy, including perhaps a government cover-up or
avoidance of embarrassment, and you should be able to press that theme as
to both arguments. That is, even though the government’s right to an
exemption and its ability to avoid segregation are legally and logically
9
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distinct, it should be possible to counter the government’s argument that it
is unable to “reasonably” segregate by pointing out its misguided interest in
secrecy. In doing so, you may be able to briefly remind the reader of the
government’s earlier impermissible exemption claims, thus ending on a
relatively high note. That’s what we tried to do at the end of this brief.
Case 3. We recently briefed an employment-discrimination appeal
involving three legally distinct, but related issues: allegations of discrete,
serious acts of discrimination, a hostile work environment, and the
employer’s retaliation against our client’s workplace opposition to the
alleged discrimination. We viewed each argument as quite strong and
important. It made sense in our judgment to begin with the discrimination
arguments and to end with the retaliation argument. After all, allegations of
retaliation for someone’s opposition to discrimination will be fully
appreciated only after the allegations of the discrimination are understood.
Some of the components of a retaliation claim can come across as dry and
technical, which is not the ideal way to end a brief. But the doctrine also
demands a connection between the employee’s opposition and the
employer’s discriminatory acts, and by stressing the latter toward the end of
the brief, we could end in a way that was legally germane to the retaliation
claim while bringing the reader back to the alleged discrimination at the
heart of the case.
* * *
In all events, to counter the endemic problem of ending a multi-issue
brief with a relatively weak or seemingly less-important argument, try to
end on a high note with the thematic approach I’ve described. And then
glide right in to your punchy, precise, relief-based conclusion, shorn of
repetitive argument.

Brian Wolfman – 12.25.2021
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